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Article
Feminist Perspectives on Bostock v. Clayton County
ANN C. MCGINLEY, NICOLE BUONOCORE PORTER,
DANIELLE WEATHERBY, RYAN H. NELSON, PAMELA WILKINS, AND
CATHERINE JEAN ARCHIBALD
This jointly-authored essay is a conversation about the Supreme Court’s recent
and groundbreaking decision (Bostock v. Clayton County) that held that
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is discrimination
based on sex, and therefore prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
While many scholars are writing about this case, we are doing something unique.
We are analyzing this decision from feminist perspectives. We are the editors and
four of the authors of a book recently published by Cambridge University
Press: Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Employment Discrimination Opinions. This
book contains fifteen Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals employment
discrimination cases that have been rewritten using feminist perspectives, along
with commentaries for each of the rewritten opinions. Two of those rewritten
opinions are Courts of Appeals cases involving gender identity (Etsitty v. Utah
Transit Authority) and sexual orientation (Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College).
Because the book was already in production when Bostock was decided, we were
unable to incorporate this momentous case into our book.
And yet, given our experiences rewriting and editing opinions from feminist
perspectives, we have something to say about Bostock and its significance for
LGBTQ+ employment cases and employment discrimination law more broadly.
Accordingly, we wrote this essay, which has three goals: first, to introduce our
book; second, to analyze the Bostock case and its effect on employment
discrimination law as it relates to sexual orientation and gender identity; and third,
to discuss more broadly the effect of Bostock on employment discrimination
jurisprudence through a feminist lens. Throughout the essay, we are attempting to
answer the question of whether Bostock is a feminist opinion. Our answers are
varied and even uncertain; but ultimately, we conclude that even though we, as
feminists, might have written it differently, the LGBTQ+ community deserves to
celebrate this momentous victory.
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Feminist Perspectives on Bostock v. Clayton County
ANN C. MCGINLEY,* NICOLE BUONOCORE PORTER,**
DANIELLE WEATHERBY,*** RYAN H. NELSON,****
PAMELA WILKINS,***** AND CATHERINE JEAN ARCHIBALD******
INTRODUCTION
On June 15, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bostock v. Clayton
County,1 holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
employment discrimination against the gay and transgender plaintiffs based
on their sexual orientation and gender identity.2 This was a momentous
decision, and many scholars have and will offer commentary on it. Our goal
here is unique. We are analyzing Bostock and its implications from feminist
perspectives.
Two of us (Ann McGinley and Nicole Porter) are the editors of Feminist
Judgments: Rewritten Employment Discrimination Opinions, a book
recently published by Cambridge University Press. The book includes
fifteen federal appellate and U.S. Supreme Court employment
discrimination opinions that have been rewritten using feminist approaches
and perspectives; each opinion is accompanied by a commentary on the
significance of the feminist rewritten opinion. The goal of the book is to
establish a body of proposed feminist employment discrimination opinions
that would demonstrate how the law could have developed (and changed) if
courts had approached their opinions by using feminist perspectives.
Because we wanted the book to represent a relatively complete body of
employment discrimination law, and because (before Bostock) there was not
a Supreme Court case addressing sexual orientation or gender identity
discrimination in the workplace, the book includes two rewritten courts of

*
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***
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****
Ryan H. Nelson is a Research Associate at Harvard Law School Project on Disability and an
adjunct faculty member at Boston University School of Law and New England Law  Boston. Danielle
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*****
Pamela Wilkins is an Associate Professor of Law at Mercer University School of Law. Pam
wrote Part III.A of this essay.
******
Catherine Jean Archibald is an Associate Professor of Law at University of Detroit Mercy
School of Law. Catherine wrote Part III.B of this essay.
1
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
2
Id. at 1737. For the codification of Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
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appeals opinions: Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana3
(addressing sexual orientation discrimination) and Etsitty v. Utah Transit
Authority,4 (addressing gender identity discrimination). Our book does not
include Bostock because the opinion came down after the book went to
production. We, therefore, offer this analysis of Bostock through a feminist
lens and how it will likely affect employment discrimination law.
After a brief summary of the Bostock decision in Part I below, Part II
provides the impressions of Bostock by the authors of the rewritten Hively
commentary and opinion and discusses what Bostock might mean for sexual
orientation discrimination going forward. In Part III, the authors of the
rewritten Etsitty commentary and opinion discuss their impressions and the
implications of Bostock for gender identity discrimination. In Part IV, the
editors of Feminist Judgments discuss the implications of Bostock on
employment discrimination as a whole. Finally, Part V attempts to answer
the question of whether Bostock is a positive opinion from feminist
perspectives.
I. BOSTOCK SUMMARIZED
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock is nothing short of
monumental. In a 6-to-3 decision,5 the majority held that discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender identity is “sex” discrimination under
Title VII.6 The issue was before the Supreme Court on three consolidated
cases—two in which gay men lost their jobs because they were gay, and one
where a transgender woman lost her job after disclosing to her employer that
she was transgender.7
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, first notes that the applicable
test—the but-for causation standard—is a “sweeping” standard, and that
events can have multiple but-for causes.8 It does not matter if there are other
factors that influenced the defendant’s decision (such as the plaintiff’s
sexual orientation or gender identity); as long as sex is one of the but-for
causes, the standard is met and the defendant is liable.9 Second, the opinion
emphasizes that it does not matter if an employer treated both sexes equally,
3
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that sexual
orientation discrimination is sex discrimination). The Hively opinion was rewritten by Ryan H. Nelson,
with a commentary by Danielle Weatherby.
4
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that discrimination against
a transgender woman was not sex discrimination). The Etsitty opinion was rewritten by Catherine
Archibald, with a commentary by Pamela Wilkins.
5
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1734. Two of the normally conservative justices—Justice Gorsuch and
Chief Justice Roberts—joined the usual four liberal justices. After the Bostock opinion, on September
18, 2020, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg passed away, leaving only three justices appointed by Democratic
presidents.
6
Id. at 1737.
7
Id. at 1737–38.
8
Id. at 1739.
9
Id.
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such as by terminating both men and women who are gay or transgender—
the focus of the statute is, and has always been, on the individual. 10 As the
Court states, if an employer fired a woman for being insufficiently feminine
and a man for being insufficiently masculine, the employer would be liable
in both cases for discrimination because of sex: “Instead of avoiding Title
VII exposure, this employer doubles it.”11
Accordingly, “[t]he statute’s message for our cases is equally simple and
momentous: An individual’s homosexuality or transgender status is not
relevant to employment decisions . . . because it is impossible to discriminate
against a person [based on sexual orientation or gender identity] without
discriminating against that individual based on sex.”12 The Court uses a
simple example to emphasize its point: consider an employer with two
employees who are otherwise identical, except that one is a man and one is
a woman. If the employer fires the male employee for no reason other than
the fact that he is attracted to men, the employer has discriminated against
him; but-for his sex, he would not have been fired for being attracted to
men.13 And even if the employer would have terminated both male and
female employees who are gay, this does not insulate the employer because
the focus is on the individual, not on the group.14
The Court relies on well-known precedents to support its holding. It cites
to Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 15 to support the position that it does not
matter if a decision is made because of sex plus another characteristic (in
Phillips, motherhood), just as it did not matter that the employer in Phillips
tended to favor hiring women over men—it was still discriminatory to refuse
to hire some women because of their sex plus their motherhood status.16
The Court also relies on City of Los Angeles, Department of Water &
Power v. Manhart17 to explain that the focus is on individuals. So even
though the employer in Manhart required individual women to contribute
more of their pay to their pension funds to offset the additional benefits
women as a group receive based on their longer life expectancies, this was
still sex discrimination under Title VII.18
And third, the Court relies on Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
19
Inc. for its often-cited statement that even though male-on-male sexual
harassment is certainly not the “principal evil Congress was concerned with
10

Id. at 1740–41.
Id. at 1741.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 1742.
15
Id. at 1743 (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)).
16
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743.
17
Id. at 1743 (citing City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978)).
18
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743.
19
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
11
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when it enacted Title VII,” it is “the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”20 Thus, it
does not matter that protecting employees against discrimination based on
sexual orientation or gender identity was not contemplated by Congress at
the time Title VII was passed.
Finally, the Court addresses the employers’ various counter-arguments,
emphasizing that the legislative history of Title VII does not matter when
the text of the statute is clear. As the Court concludes, Congress’s broad
language prohibiting discrimination based on sex leads to this result: “We
do not hesitate to recognize today a necessary consequence of that legislative
choice: An employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or
transgender defies the law.”21
II. ANALYZING BOSTOCK FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF REWRITTEN HIVELY22
In the most significant civil rights victory for the LGBTQ+ community
since the landmark decision five years ago in Obergefell v. Hodges23 and
after decades of Title VII litigation, the Supreme Court held in Bostock that
sexual orientation discrimination violates Title VII’s sex discrimination
prohibition.24 Its decision finally rectified the post-Obergefell paradox that
“a gay person could be legally married in any of the fifty states on Saturday
and fired from her job because of that marriage on Monday.” 25
While the Bostock majority’s decision was monumental, it followed a
predictable path, echoing much of the reasoning—while curiously omitting
parts—of the Seventh Circuit’s 2017 decision in Hively.26 Here we highlight
the stark similarities and distinctions between the two opinions. We
conclude, as we predicted it might in the Feminist Judgments book,27 that
the Bostock Court’s analysis resounds in the same missed opportunities as
that of the Hively Court’s. Indeed, the Bostock opinion serves its purpose,
but its clear avoidance of anti-essentialist feminist arguments and real-world
storytelling minimizes the decades of discrimination and suffering LGBTQ+
20
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743–44 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79
(1998)).
21
Id. at 1754.
22
This part was jointly written by Danielle Weatherby and Ryan H. Nelson.
23
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 674–76 (2015) (holding that same-sex couples enjoy a
fundamental right to marriage under the Constitution).
24
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754.
25
Danielle Weatherby, Commentary: Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, in FEMINIST
JUDGEMENTS: REWRITTEN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION OPINIONS, 301–11 (Ann C. McGinley &
Nicole Buonocore Porter eds., 2020) (citing Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities,
Sexual Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 728–32 (2010)); S.
1006, 115th Cong. (2017); Fair and Equal Housing Act of 2017, H.R. 1447, 115th Cong. (2017)).
26
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
27
Weatherby, supra note 25; Ryan H. Nelson, Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, in FEMINIST
JUDGEMENTS: REWRITTEN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION OPINIONS, 311–33 (Ann C. McGinley &
Nicole Buonocore Porter eds., 2020).
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employees have endured in the workplace while other employees enjoyed
protection from discrimination based on their sex.
As if joined in chorus with Hively, the Bostock majority reverberates a
familiar refrain. Just like in Hively, the Bostock majority opinion is a
measured, textualist means to an end, silent with respect to the ways in which
gender stereotypes involving sexual orientation actually operate in the
contemporary workplace. We begin by noting two qualitative parallels.
First, both opinions characterize the question presented as one of “pure
. . . statutory interpretation,”28 stressing that the term “sex” in the Title VII
employment statute is unambiguous.29 Together, the majorities of both
courts chastised critics’ attempts to assert the ambiguity of the term. 30
Indeed, both courts refused to assign meaning to Congress’s failure to
anticipate the application of Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition to
sexual orientation.31 Concluding instead that what matters is only “what the
correct rule of law is now,”32 both courts engaged in rather simplistic
narratives about how sex is inextricably intertwined with sexual orientation.
In Hively, Chief Judge Diane Wood asserted that “[i]t would require
considerable calisthenics to remove the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual orientation,’”
concluding that “it is actually impossible to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation without discriminating on the basis of sex.”33 As if
mirroring her language and reasoning, Justice Gorsuch opined that, “it is
impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or
transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.”34
While his matter-of-fact syllogism sets the stage for the desired outcome, it
avoids any discussion of what behavior led to the Court’s query in the first
place, giving short shrift to the human experience at stake. Indeed, Justice
Gorsuch began by acknowledging that “[f]ew facts are needed to appreciate
28

Hively, 853 F.3d at 343; accord Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738–39.
Hively, 853 F.3d at 343–44 (stating that “[f]ew people would insist that there is a need to delve
into secondary sources if the statute is plain on its face,” in discussing the word “sex” in the Title VII
statute); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743 (stating that “[a]t bottom, these cases involve no more than the
straightforward application of legal terms with plain and settled meanings.”).
30
Hively, 853 F.3d at 344 (responding to legislative history arguments by stating, “[i]n the end, we
have no idea what inference to draw from congressional inaction or later enactments, because there is no
way of knowing what explains each individual member’s votes, much less what explains the failure of
the body as a whole to change this 1964 statute,”); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747 (critiquing legislative
history arguments in stating, “[a]ll we can know for certain is that speculation about why a later Congress
declined to adopt new legislation offers a ‘particularly dangerous’ basis on which to rest an interpretation
of an existing law a different and earlier Congress did adopt”).
31
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749 (stating that “[b]ut ‘the fact that [a statute] has been applied in
situations not expressly anticipated by Congress’ does not demonstrate ambiguity; instead, it simply
‘demonstrates [the] breadth’ of a legislative command”); Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (asserting that “the fact
that the enacting Congress may not have anticipated a particular application of the law cannot stand in
the way of the provisions of the law that are on the books”).
32
Hively, 853 F.3d at 350.
33
Id. at 350–51.
34
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741.
29
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the legal question [the Court] face[s],” devoting one short page to the
combined stories of each of the three plaintiffs in the trilogy.
Second, both the Hively and the Bostock courts squandered an important
opportunity to reflect upon the values originally secured by Title VII. While
they discounted the premise that Title VII was concerned solely with the
treatment of a protected group as a whole and were unequivocal in their
declaration that the emphasis of Title VII is on the individual,36 they failed
to pay homage to the individual person by omitting any real discussion of
Title VII’s inherent values and the substantive rights at stake.37 Both courts
failed to reaffirm the feminist ideals that ground Title VII, refusing to
elaborate as to why sex discrimination is a pernicious matter in the first place.
While the Bostock and Hively opinions share many similarities in their
approach, there is one glaring difference between them. Hively interweaves
the “but for” and sex stereotyping analyses.38 Nelson’s rewritten Hively
opinion disaggregates the two and puts stereotyping out front as the simplest
and most impactful argument that sex discrimination includes sexual
orientation discrimination.39 However, Bostock bypasses sex stereotyping as
a necessary means to its end.40
The argument that discrimination based on sexual orientation reflects
sex stereotypes (e.g., women ought to be attracted to men, not women) first
appeared in writing in the late 1980s,41 before the majority of the Supreme
Court recognized in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that Title VII’s prohibition
on sex discrimination bars adverse employment actions based on an
employee’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes.42 However, the argument
does not appear in early battles vis-à-vis sexual orientation discrimination as
sex discrimination.43 Occasionally, plaintiffs in this era contended that
discrimination based on stereotypically homosexual behaviors and
appearances constituted sex stereotypes, but they failed to argue that sexual
35

35

Id. at 1737.
Id. at 1748 (finding that “Title VII’s plain terms and our precedents don’t care if an employer
treats men and women comparably as groups; an employer who fires both lesbians and gay men equally
doesn’t diminish but doubles its liability”).
37
Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (asserting that “[f]raming the [comparison] that way swaps the critical
characteristic (here, sex) for both the complainant and the comparator and thus obscures the key point—
whether the complainant’s protected characteristic played a role in the adverse employment decision”);
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742 (“Title VII liability is not limited to employers who, through the sum of all
of their employment actions, treat the class of men differently than the class of women.”).
38
Hively, 853 F.3d at 345–47.
39
Nelson, supra note 27, at 318.
40
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
41
See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV.
187, 188 (1988).
42
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (plurality opinion), 259 (White, J., concurring),
261 (O’Connor, J, concurring) (1989); see also Hively, 853 F.3d at 346 n.2.
43
See, e.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996); Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989).
36
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44

orientation discrimination was, ipso facto, sex stereotyping.
It was not until the early 2000s that plaintiffs began to raise, and courts
began to embrace, the “discrimination based on sexual orientation is sex
stereotyping” argument.45 By the 2010s, courts and agencies relied upon, or
at least debated, that argument at nearly every turn.46 Hence, it was no
surprise to see it in Hively, the lower court cases leading to Bostock, and the
arguments in Bostock.47 It is the argument’s ubiquity and persuasiveness that
renders its absence in the majority’s opinion in Bostock jarring. To be clear,
the majority reaffirms the sex stereotyping doctrine in dicta,48 and Justice
Alito’s dissent discusses and rebukes the argument in earnest,49 but neither
the six-justice majority nor Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent analyzes whether
sexual orientation discrimination reflects sex stereotypes.
Why not? As discussed, supra, its absence shortchanges the LGBTQ+
community by muzzling anti-essentialist feminist arguments and real-world
storytelling that could have given names, faces, and histories to the countless
LGBTQ+ employees who have been subjugated and marginalized for so
long. We suspect two possible reasons for the Court’s failure to seriously
engage with this argument, neither of which portends optimism for feminism
or LGBTQ+ rights.
First, perhaps the justices could not agree that all heterosexism (i.e.,
stereotypes against all non-heterosexual orientations)50 violates Title VII.
Indeed, the Court concludes that “[a]n employer who fires an individual
merely for being gay or transgender defies the law[,]” 51 and not that
discrimination based on any sexual orientation or gender identity is
unlawful. To reach that conclusion, Justice Gorsuch explains that, when an
employer fires a “male employee for no reason other than the fact he is
attracted to men, the employer discriminates against him for traits or actions

44

E.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 37–38 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic
Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th
Cir. 1979).
45
E.g., Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. Or. 2002);
Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002).
46
E.g., Baldwin v. Foxx, Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7–8 (EEOC July 15,
2015); Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 116 (D.D.C. 2014).
47
Hively, 853 F.3d at 345–47; see, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 119 (2d Cir.
2018); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance in No. 17-1618 and Reversal
in No. 17-1623 at 23, Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (Aug. 23, 2019) (Nos. 17-1618, 171623), 2019 WL 4014070; Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731
(Oct. 8, 2019) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623).
48
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742–43.
49
Id. at 1763 (Alito, J., dissenting).
50
Gregory M. Herek, Psychological Heterosexism in the United States, in LESBIAN, GAY, AND
BISEXUAL IDENTITIES OVER THE LIFESPAN: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 321, 321 (Anthony R.
D’Augelli & Charlotte J. Patterson eds., 1995).
51
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754. Elsewhere in the opinion, Justice Gorsuch uses the outdated term
“homosexual” instead of “gay.” Id. at 1742.
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it tolerates in his female colleague.” Hence, all that appears to matter is
whether the employee’s sex, if altered, would have caused a different result.
Given that analysis, it is possible that Bostock bans discrimination based
on bisexuality because bisexuality can be defined by the employee’s sex
(i.e., firing a male employee because he is attracted to, inter alia, men, a trait
or action the employer tolerates in his female colleagues). However, it is also
possible that Bostock does not prohibit discrimination based on bisexuality
because bisexuality can just as easily be defined without regard to the
employee’s sex (i.e., firing an employee for being attracted to individuals of
either binary sex). Even less clear is whether Bostock bans discrimination
based on pansexuality (i.e., attraction to individuals regardless of sex),
asexuality (i.e., no sexual attraction), or demisexuality or graysexuality (i.e.,
limited sexual attraction),53 all of which manifest the sex-based stereotype
of heterosexism but none of which definitionally rely on the sex of the
employee. We will have to wait and see whether lower courts apply Bostock
to these forms of discrimination and, if not, whether they find alternative
bases for applying Title VII to them, as Nelson’s rewritten opinion does.
Second, Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent’s silence concerning sex
stereotyping raises the specter that a growing minority on the Court
questions whether sex stereotyping constitutes sex discrimination at all. To
that end, Justice Alito’s dissent states that sex stereotyping can evince sex
discrimination but sex stereotyping does not necessarily violate Title VII, 54
notwithstanding that six justices in Hopkins hold otherwise.55 In contrast, the
majority in Bostock confirmed that employers who fire employees “for
failing to fulfill traditional sex stereotypes” violate Title VII, 56
demonstrating that this foundational conclusion is safe for now. But Justice
Kavanaugh declined to take sides. With replacement justices on the Court
likely in the coming years, it is paramount that the President nominate and
the Senate confirm justices who recognize that sex stereotyping constitutes
sex discrimination to ensure that Title VII is accurately interpreted to bar all
forms of sex-based essentialism.57
52

52

Id. at 1741.
Michael
Gold,
The
ABCs
of
L.G.B.T.Q.I.A.+,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/style/lgbtq-gender-language.html (June 7, 2019).
54
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1763 (Alito, J., dissenting).
55
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (plurality opinion), 259 (White, J., concurring), 261 (O’Connor, J,
concurring).
56
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742.
57
Justice Barrett has neither issued public opinions vis-à-vis sex stereotyping nor publicly opined
about sex stereotyping, so her views are just as uncertain as those of Justice Kavanaugh.
53
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III. ANALYZING BOSTOCK FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF REWRITTEN ETSITTY
A. Bostock Is a Disappointment58
For me, Bostock is a disappointment.
Don’t get me wrong. I like the result. And having approached the case
with equal parts hope and dread, I am relieved that the Court did not
eviscerate Price Waterhouse.59 Moreover, Bostock almost certainly reflects
a compromise among the justices, with Justice Gorsuch writing a textualist
opinion. Had the opinion taken any other form and been assigned to any
other justice, the result may have been different. In short, the advocates’
shrewd and pragmatic focus on textualism likely cemented the employees’
victory. A 6-3 vote in favor of LGBTQ+ rights? I will take it.
But still. Though it achieves a feminist result, Bostock is not really a
feminist judgment. Rather, the opinion reads as a clumsy, pedantic, and—I
hate this—unconvincing exercise in Textualism 101.
There are three reasons for my disappointment in Justice Gorsuch’s
textualist opinion.
First, as noted above, the majority’s textualism feels clunky and
unconvincing. It especially suffers in comparison to the dissenting Justice
Kavanaugh’s textualist rebuttal. Perhaps Justice Kavanaugh is simply a
more talented writer and rhetorician. Certainly, Justice Gorsuch could not
match Justice Kavanaugh’s elegant use of metaphor (e.g., “Seneca Falls was
not Stonewall”60); of repetition (e.g., “To fire one employee because she is
a woman and another employee because he is gay implicates two distinct
societal concerns, reveals two distinct biases, imposes two distinct harms,
and falls within two distinct statutory prohibitions”61); of zeugma62 (“Judges
may not update the law merely because they think that Congress does not
have the votes or the fortitude.”)63 And so forth. What is worse, Justice
Kavanaugh’s dissent more effectively—and, at times, more convincingly—
defends a specific textualist methodology,64 marshals precedent in support
of his argument, and situates the legal question within a set of broader
concerns (separation of powers, most notably).
This first objection to the majority opinion may not rest on specifically
58

This sub-part was written by Pamela Wilkins.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
60
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
61
Id. at 1835 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
62
Zeugma is the “use of a word to modify or govern two or more words usually in such a manner
that it applies to each in a different sense or makes sense with only one (as in ‘opened the door and her
heart to the homeless boy’).” Zeugma—Definition of Zeugma, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/zeugma (last visited July 18, 2020).
63
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1824 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
64
Justice Kavanaugh argues that basic principles of statutory interpretation require the Court to
consider the ordinary meaning of phrases used in statutes, rather than merely looking at the dictionary
definitions of each word standing separately. Id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
59
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feminist grounds, but I still think it is important. To say Justice Kavanaugh’s
dissent is rhetorically stronger than the majority opinion does not mean the
dissent is correct. However, it does mean that Gerald Bostock, Donald
Zarda, and Aimee Stephens—not to mention all LGBTQ+ persons, all
Americans, the history books, even the employers—deserved a more
compelling articulation of and justification for the holding that Title VII
protects those who are LGBTQ+.
So the first thing I might change is the author of the majority opinion.
Even if real-politik required a textualist approach, Chief Justice Roberts is,
in my view, a better match for Justice Kavanaugh. If that change would have
cost the majority Justice Gorsuch’s vote, so be it. I would prefer an
intellectually convincing 5-4 judgment to a weaker 6-3 decision.
Second, I worry about what a strict textualist approach may portend for
the future. Textualism has yielded victories for progressives during the
Court’s 2019–2020 term, most notably in Bostock and in McGirt v.
Oklahoma.65 I am still skeptical—enough so that I wonder whether
textualism can be a feminist method, even when, as in Bostock, it achieves
a feminist result. (This question—whether textualism can be a legitimate
feminist tool—is large enough that I only pose it here; actual exploration of
the question is well beyond the scope of this project.)
Third—and this is by far the largest disappointment—the majority’s
textualist opinion never seriously acknowledges what is at stake. And in this
lack of acknowledgement, the Court misses what I consider the real
argument for why Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination protects
persons who are LGBTQ+.
Although the legal issue is correctly defined, the majority opinion is an
exercise in missing the forest for the trees.66 Great attention is paid to the
statutory term sex, but one still could read whole stretches of the opinion and
hardly know that the stakes were any higher than, say, the fate of a dangling
participle.67 In all the parsing of the term sex, Justice Gorsuch never cuts to
the chase about the real stakes, about why discrimination against persons
who are LGBTQ+ is really and obviously sex discrimination.
So let me cut to the chase: Discrimination against persons on the basis
of LGBTQ+ status is rooted in and implicitly “justified” by their perceived
and actual violation of the patriarchal norms that structure our society.
In short, discrimination against LGBTQ+ persons cannot be separated
65
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2482 (2020) (holding, inter alia, that land recognized
through an 1833 Treaty as belonging to the Creek Nation remained a Creek reservation, and that the State
of Oklahoma could not try Native Americans under state law for crimes committed on that land).
66
Justice Kavanaugh accused the majority of missing the forest for the trees, see Bostock, 140 S.
Ct. at 1827 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), and he was right (albeit for a different reason from the one I
advance here). He was referring to the majority’s wrongheaded version of textualism. As my comments
make clear, I am referring to something quite different.
67
Id. at 1755–837. Both dissenting opinions seem more aware of the import and stakes of the
decision than does the majority. Justice Kavanaugh appears gracious, and Justice Alito churlish, but they
both have a sense of the moment.
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from gender norms and stereotypes. Indeed, the highly gendered nature of
this discrimination—one discriminates against gay men, against lesbians,
against transgender women, against transgender men, and not against
LGBTQ+ persons as an all-encompassing class—becomes even clearer
upon closer consideration. For instance, those perceived to violate norms of
masculinity—gay men and transgender women—are often policed and
punished much more strongly than those who violate norms of femininity.68
If the discrimination were against LGBTQ+ persons as a class rather than
against discrete subgroups (based on gender), one would expect similar
levels of “punishment.”
Price Waterhouse and its progeny tell us that sex includes gender, and
that discrimination for failure to conform to a gender stereotype is sex
discrimination under Title VII.69 I believe the Bostock majority should have
relied more heavily on the Price Waterhouse line of cases. Such an approach
would have been rooted in solid precedent, as well as in the virtues of clarity
and truthfulness. Reliance on Price Waterhouse also would have laid a more
solid foundation for future cases, including cases about bathroom rights and
about the rights of persons who are gender non-binary. Happy as I am about
the outcome, the majority’s wooden textualism represents an opportunity
missed.
B. Bostock: Unfinished Progress70
Bostock is almost entirely what I wished it would be, and yet, there are
unanswered questions.
1. What I am Happy About
Advocates for LGBTQ+ rights waited with bated breath for the Supreme
Court’s Bostock opinion, most of us unsure what to expect and believing that
the decision could easily go either way. Therefore, when I read the decision,
I was delighted. It was, after all, a 6-3 decision in favor of the LGBTQ+
employees. The Bostock Court held that when an employer discriminates
against a transgender employee, that employer discriminates on the basis of
sex, in violation of Title VII.71 The Court used the simple, yet hotly contested
reasoning that when an employer discriminates against an employee “for
actions or attributes it would tolerate in an individual of another sex” the

68

Consider, for example, the difference in the rates at which transgender women and transgender
men are murdered: Of the thirty-two documented murders of transgender or nonbinary persons thus far
in 2020, eighteen were of transgender women (many of whom were African American). See Fatal
Violence Against the Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming Community in 2020, HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/violence-against-the-trans-and-gender-non-conformingcommunity-in-2020 (last visited July 18, 2020).
69
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 257–58 (1989).
70
This sub-part was written by Catherine Jean Archibald.
71
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
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employer violates Title VII. The Court reasoned that when an employer
discriminates based on transgender status, the employer necessarily
considers the employee’s assigned sex at birth in taking the adverse action
against the employee; therefore, sex is a but for cause of the discrimination.73
2. Unanswered Questions
i.

Are Non-Binary Transgender People Protected?

The Bostock opinion’s reasoning mirrors much of my reasoning in the
rewritten Etsitty opinion.74 However, the Bostock opinion does not go as far
as rewritten Etsitty because it does not address whether Title VII protects
transgender non-binary individuals who identify as something other than
exclusively male and female.75 Although Crystal Etsitty identified as female
(rather than non-binary), I incorporated non-binary transgender individuals
into my holding when I discussed at length the Price Waterhouse case.76 By
contrast, the Bostock majority opinion does not discuss Price Waterhouse at
all, citing to it only once.77 This failure is disappointing. Price Waterhouse
held that discrimination because an employee does not conform to sex
stereotypes is sex discrimination.78 Since transgender individuals by
definition do not conform to certain sex stereotypes (such as stereotypes that
assume that everyone will identify with their assigned sex at birth), Price
Waterhouse has played a huge part in advancing transgender rights in the
courts since it was decided in 1989.79
While the dissents characterize the majority decision as holding that
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on gender identity and sexual
orientation,80 this is not actually what the majority decision held. Instead, it
held that under Title VII an employer may not discriminate against an

72

Id. at 1740.
Id. at 1741.
74
See Catherine Jean Archibald, Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS:
REWRITTEN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION OPINIONS, 278–300 (Ann C. McGinley & Nicole
Buonocore Porter eds., 2020) (disagreeing with the original Etsitty opinion and holding there was a
violation of Title VII).
75
See GLAAD Media Reference Guide 10th Edition, GLAAD 11 (Oct. 2016),
https://www.glaad.org/sites/default/files/GLAAD-Media-Reference-Guide-Tenth-Edition.pdf (defining
non-binary as a term for “people who experience their gender identity and/or gender expression as falling
outside the categories of man and woman”).
76
Archibald, supra note 74, at 281–84.
77
See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989)
for the proposition that an “individual employee’s sex is ‘not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or
compensation of employees’”).
78
See Archibald, supra note 74, at 282–83 (discussing Price Waterhouse in depth).
79
See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Price Waterhouse
in finding for transgender plaintiff).
80
See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1757 (Alito, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority decision
as finding that Title VII protects against discrimination based on “sexual orientation” and “gender
identity”); Id. at 1823 & n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (same).
73
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employee because the employee is “homosexual or transgender.” Although
the Court uses the term “transgender,” a term that includes non-binary
individuals,82 the Court uses examples only of transgender individuals who
identify as either male or female.83 The Court’s reliance on the statutory text
protecting an individual from discrimination based on that individual’s sex,84
and its reasoning based solely on switching the individual employee’s sex
assigned at birth and asking whether the employer would still have taken the
same action against the employee, leaves open the question of whether the
Court’s reasoning would extend to protect non-binary transgender
employees. After all, an employer could claim that it does not care what sex
an individual employee is or was identified as at birth: it simply will not
tolerate any individual who does not identify as either male or female. This
gap in the Court’s decision remains for future cases to fill in.
81

ii.

Can Transgender Individuals Use Bathrooms at Work that
Correspond to their Gender Identity?

Another gap I wish the Court had addressed is the bathroom issue for
transgender workers. Instead, the Court stated that it was not considering
bathrooms.85 Despite this explicit denial, however, the logic of the Court’s
reasoning should protect transgender workers who use the bathroom that
best corresponds with their gender identity, at least when there are only
men’s and women’s bathrooms available. (Whether an employer could
require transgender employees to use gender-inclusive bathrooms when
available is another question.) Given the choice of men’s or women’s
bathrooms, many transgender people are most comfortable using the
bathroom corresponding to the sex they were not assigned at birth.86
Therefore, if an employer could simply state that it was firing a transgender
employee, not for being transgender, but simply for using the “wrong”
bathroom, this may be an easy way for the employer to circumvent the
Supreme Court’s explicit holding that discriminating against an employee
simply for being transgender is not permitted under Title VII.
Furthermore, the Bostock Court’s reasoning logically should mean that
an employer may not fire an employee simply for using a bathroom that does
not correspond to their sex identified at birth. If the employer allows a person
81

Id. at 1737.
See Sandy E. James, Jody L. Herman, Susan Rankin, Mara Keisling, Lisa Mottet & Ma’ayan
Anafi, The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 45
(Dec. 2016), http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-FINAL.PDF
(finding that about one-third of transgender individuals identify as non-binary).
83
See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (discussing a “transgender person who was identified as a
male at birth but who now identifies as a female”).
84
Id. at 1740.
85
Id. at 1753.
86
See James et al., supra note 82, at 44 (showing 63% of transgender people identify as either male
or female).
82
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identified as female at birth to use the women’s restrooms, then it must,
under the Supreme Court’s logic,87 allow someone identified as male at birth
to also use the women’s restrooms, and vice versa. Therefore, as I also
opined in the rewritten Etsitty opinion88 (and elsewhere89), bathrooms cannot
be legally sex-segregated and should instead be gender inclusive.
Bostock is a hugely important and positive decision by the Supreme
Court. It is conservatively written and addresses only the precise questions
before it—whether two gay employees and one transgender employee may
be fired under Title VII because of their sexual orientation or gender
identity.90 Later cases will have to decide the questions still left lingering by
this case.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BOSTOCK ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW91
Here we address some of the broader feminist implications of the
Bostock opinion, beyond its impact on LGBTQ+ persons.
A. “But For” Causation
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in Bostock asserts that “but for” causation is
a “sweeping standard” and that the protected characteristic does not have to
be the “primary” cause of the decision for liability to attach.92 This is an
important clarification for future employment discrimination cases,
especially Title VII retaliation claims and age discrimination claims under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),93 both of which must
be proved using “but for” causation.94 Before Bostock, defense counsel had
argued with some success that “but for” means the sole cause in
discrimination cases,95 an argument that is no longer viable. Limiting “but
87
The Court reasoned that when an employer discriminates against an employee “for actions . . . it
would tolerate in an individual of another sex” the employer violates Title VII. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at
1740.
88
Archibald, supra note 74, at 295–300.
89
Catherine Jean Archibald, Transgender Student in Maine May Use Bathroom that Matches
Gender Identity—Are Co-Ed Bathrooms Next?, 83 UMKC L. REV. 57, 57 (2014); Catherine Jean
Archibald, De-Clothing Sex-Based Classifications—Same-Sex Marriage Is Just the Beginning:
Achieving Formal Sex Equality in the Modern Era, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009).
90
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737–38.
91
This part was written by Ann McGinley and Nicole Porter.
92
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–40.
93
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34.
94
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013) (holding Title VII retaliation
claims must be proven with “but for” causation); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009)
(holding ADEA claims must be proven with “but for” causation).
95
See, e.g., Johanna T. Wise & Alex Meier, Causation in Federal Remedial Rights and Alternative
Pleading,
SEYFARTH
SHAW
LLP
(Oct.
20,
2015),
https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2015/10/causation-in-federal-remedial-rights-andalternative-pleading (noting that several federal district courts have concluded that “but for” cause means
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for” to sole cause would harm not only those plaintiffs bringing ADEA and
Title VII retaliation cases, but also those bringing other Title VII cases using
the “but for” proof standard.
Moreover, a clarification that “but for” goes beyond sole cause may
support intersectional claims in which plaintiffs allege that an adverse
employment action or harassment occurred because of two characteristics,
such as the plaintiff’s sex and race. If plaintiffs prove that both protected
traits are “but for” causes of the adverse action, they should prevail.96
B. “Literal Textualism”: Dress Codes and Affirmative Action
All circuits currently permit employers to use sex-specific dress and
grooming codes—without proving that the dress codes are a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the position in question—so long as
the dress and grooming codes impose equal burdens on men and women.97
The authors of the rewritten opinion in our book, Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Company, Inc., conclude that the unequal burdens test violates
the text of Title VII. 98 Bostock’s literal textualism will likely lead to the
disavowal of the unequal burdens test because it permits employers to use
sex-specific grooming policies that discriminate based on sex. In Bostock,
for example, the Court emphasizes that discrimination against an individual
because of sex cannot be cured by treating the group well as a whole.99 The
Court states, “an employer cannot escape liability by demonstrating that it
treats males and females comparably as groups.”100 The “unequal burdens”
test cannot survive this conclusion.
Instead, Bostock should require employers to prove that a particular sexspecific dress or grooming requirement is a BFOQ for the job. Given the
narrow interpretation of the BFOQ defense, very few employers will be able
to prove this affirmative defense.
While literal textualism is useful for some feminist approaches to anti“sole cause”); Savage v. Secure First Credit Union, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1216 (N.D. Ala. 2015), rev’d
on other grounds, No. 15–12704, 2016 WL 2997171 (11th Cir. May 25, 2016) (per curiam) (concluding
that the “but for” requirement in Title VII retaliation claims and ADEA claims means “sole cause”).
96
Scholars have been arguing in favor of sex-plus-age claims for many years. See, e.g., Rebecca
Hanner White, Aging on Air: Sex, Age and Television News, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1323, 1331–37,
1337–38 (2020) (discussing sex plus age claims); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination:
Protecting Older Women Workers, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 79 (2003) (arguing in favor of a sex plus age
cause of action). And yet, no Court of Appeals had explicitly recognized such a claim until recently when
the Tenth Circuit relied on Bostock to hold that sex-plus-age discrimination is a viable claim under Title
VII. Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1045–48 (10th Cir. 2020).
97
See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d. 1104, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the employer’s grooming policy that required women to wear makeup at all times did not
create an unequal burden on women).
98
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & JoAnne Sweeny, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., in FEMINIST
JUDGEMENTS: REWRITTEN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION OPINIONS, 136–39 (Ann C. McGinley &
Nicole Buonocore Porter eds., 2020).
99
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740 (2020).
100
Id. at 1744.
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discrimination law, it may also create problems. For example, it is possible
that Johnson v. Transportation Agency101 will not survive scrutiny after
Bostock. In Johnson, the Court upheld the employer’s affirmative action
plan.102 An affirmative action plan that takes sex into account is valid,
according to Johnson, if it benefits a group (women) that was historically
underrepresented in traditionally segregated jobs and does not
“unnecessarily trammel” the rights of men.103 Affirmative action plans
remain important because there are still many jobs (including higherpaid/higher-status jobs) that are predominantly held by men. Bostock’s
emphasis on the text of Title VII, which forbids discrimination against
individuals based on sex, will likely support a challenge to employers’
affirmative action plans. This result would harm women in the workplace
and produce an anti-feminist result.
C. Bostock and Religion
Bostock also lays out what could be a dangerous exception: religion.
While the statute explicitly exempts religious organizations from the Act’s
requirements, the Court mentions two additional protections of religion in
the face of anti-discrimination law.104 First, the Court has created a
ministerial exception to discrimination claims, which defines “minister”
broadly.105 Second, and perhaps even more chilling to feminist concerns, the
Court states that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 106 acts as a
“super statute” and may therefore “supersede Title VII’s commands in
appropriate cases.”107 RFRA forbids “the federal government from
substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion unless . . . [the
government proves] that doing so both furthers a compelling governmental
interest and represents the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest.”108 Thus, private employers who operate secular businesses may
use RFRA to argue that it is permissible to discriminate against LGBTQ+
individuals or even cisgender/heterosexual women because hiring these
individuals violates the employers’ religious beliefs.109 If these arguments
101

Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641–42 (1987).
Id.
103
Id. at 631–32, 634, 637–38.
104
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754.
105
Id. See also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188
(2012) (holding a “called” religious school teacher’s ADA claim was barred because she was a minister
for purposes of the ministerial exception which is based in the Religion Clause of the First Amendment);
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2062 (2020) (holding that Catholic
school teachers’ claims under the ADEA and ADA were barred by the ministerial exception).
106
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb–4 (2018).
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Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754 (citing to 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–3 (2018)).
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Id. (citing to 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1 (2018)).
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See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 707–12, 719, 726, 728 (2014)
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are successful, they would seriously dampen the feminist project to avoid
gender as a basis for decision making in employment.
CONCLUSION: IS BOSTOCK A POSITIVE OPINION FROM FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES?110
As Wilkins explains above, granting equal rights to persons of different
sexual orientations and gender identities furthers the feminist project
because doing so helps break down the patriarchy and rigid gendered norms
that harm individuals. Transgender individuals who self-identify as women
suffer much more discrimination than those who self-identify as men.111
Moreover, although there is a recent increase in acceptance of gay men,
many in our society continue to associate masculinity with heterosexuality
and gay sexual orientation with being “effeminate,” traditionally a
derogatory term.112 These attitudes result from the patriarchy and male
supremacy and many persons (including heterosexual women) are oppressed
by them. For decades, non-heterosexual and gender non-conforming
individuals either silently suffered discrimination in the workplace or
cobbled together uncertain and inadequate remedies, where relief depended
on the state (or even city) where one worked, or whether the federal courts
recognized the discrimination they suffered as sex stereotyping under Price
Waterhouse and its progeny. The result in Bostock challenges these
patriarchal views and makes suing employers for sexual orientation and
gender identity discrimination much easier.
But, as our Feminist Judgments book demonstrates, the end result is not
the only goal of a judicial opinion; opinions can be anti-feminist even though
their holdings further employment opportunities for subordinated workers.
In fact, we chose several cases to rewrite for our book even though their
holdings were positive.113 We did so for several reasons: some avoided
mandated that employers provide insurance for employees’ contraceptive care and counseling violated
RFRA).
110
This part was written by Ann McGinley and Nicole Porter.
111
See Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment
Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 713, 748–50 (2010) (comparing treatment of transgender
women and men in workplaces).
112
Id. at 721–23, 727 (explaining that men compete to prove their masculinity by demonstrating
that they are not gay).
113
See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (holding that direct evidence is not
needed in mixed-motive cases); Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)
(holding that the employer could not prove its BFOQ defense to justify a fetal protection policy that
prohibited fertile women from working in certain positions); Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S.
206 (2015) (developing a new framework for pregnancy accommodation cases that will make it easier
for pregnant workers to obtain accommodations under Title VII); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that hostile environment harassment is actionable under Title VII); Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding that same-sex harassment is actionable
under Title VII); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 53 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that
sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination under Title VII).
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describing the very real harm that the plaintiffs suffered, silencing the stories
of those women (and men); some left open issues that might create more
uncertainty and litigation in the future; and some described the problem in a
way that continues to subordinate those individuals that the result was
arguably meant to protect.
Some of these problems also exist with Bostock. First, as described by
Nelson and Weatherby, the Court ignored the stories of the victims of
discrimination in these cases. In doing so, the Court also refused to explain
why discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity is
harmful to all workers who have suffered such discrimination. Second, as
described by Wilkins, the majority did not confront the implicit bias inherent
in sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination. Moreover, we are
troubled by the issues the Court either did not address at all or addressed in
a convoluted way. Some of these issues have been mentioned above, such
as: whether Bostock will protect bisexuals or individuals with other sexual
orientations; whether individuals who do not identify on the gender binary
will be protected; whether courts will broadly apply the religious exemption;
and, as Archibald discussed, whether employers may legally continue to
discriminate against non-cisgender employees by requiring them to use a
bathroom they are not comfortable using.
But, as we discussed in Part IV, there might also be some positive
consequences that flow from the Court’s decision, including a broader “butfor” test, getting rid of the unequal burdens test, and expanded opportunities
for intersectional arguments and coverage.
So, is Bostock a positive opinion from feminist perspectives? Yes, and
perhaps, no, but it is too early to tell whether any positive or negative
consequences will flow from it, and if so, which ones. For now, we think the
LGBTQ+ community deserves to celebrate this momentous victory. As
feminists, we celebrate getting one step closer to equal opportunity in the
workplace for all subordinated workers.

